Who has the stomach to dig into an Irish football post-mortem after watching the abysmal funerary procession that was the 2016 season? Well, fortunately (?) for all you fans out there, we here at 18 Stripes have stomachs made of cast iron and intestinal fortitude of the type that inspires legends, so we’re up to the task. Or, you know, maybe it’s just an obsessive need to write about Notre Dame football, but we’ll pretend we’re Alec Baldwin in Glengarry Glen Ross and we’re about to open our briefcase. Off we go, then, on a quest to understand how exactly Brian Kelly ended up with a set of steak knives in 2016 and missed out on the Eldorado.

Kicking Off The Irish Football Post-Mortem

Let’s take a look at exactly how bad the 2016 season was, historically.

  • 1956: 2-8, Terry Brennan
  • 1960: 2-8, Joe Kuharich
  • 2007: 3-9, Charlie Weis
  • 2016: 4-8, Brian Kelly

That is a comprehensive list of eight-loss-or-worse seasons, and the men responsible for them, in the entire 128-season history of Notre Dame football. Terry Brennan lasted two more seasons after the 1956 debacle, going 13-7 before giving way to Joe Kuharich. Kuharich never topped .500 in four seasons, going 5-5, 2-8, 5-5, and 5-5 before Hugh Devore took one for the team in 1963 and kept the seat warm for Ara’s 1964 arrival. Charlie Weis, as you may remember, never recovered, going 13-12 over the next two seasons before being dumped for Brian Kelly.

Of course, it’s tempting to draw parallels between Kelly and the most unfortunate of his Irish predecessors. Like with so many things about Kelly’s tenure, though, we find on closer inspection that he doesn’t really have parallels: Kelly’s 2016 season was substantially better, or perhaps we should say less horrific, than each of those other nightmares. Here’s the point differential for each of those seasons:

  • 1956: -159
  • 1960: -77
  • 2007: -148
  • 2016: +37

Yes, in a statistical anomaly that truly highlights the absurdity that was Notre Dame football in 2016, the Irish posted a 0.333 win percentage and a positive point differential. More on that in a bit.

Kelly’s average point differential across seven Notre Dame seasons is +89, and this year was his lowest differential. Charlie Weis’s average across five seasons was +35. Kuharich’s average across four seasons was -42. Brennan’s average across five seasons was +36. One of these things is not like the others, one of these things just isn’t the same… As noted above, Kelly’s Notre Dame record falls into something of a no-man’s land. By just about any measure, he’s clearly better than the guys who have failed at Notre Dame; likewise, by just about any measure, he’s nowhere near the guys who have been successful. That’s a topic for another post, no doubt, but the main point to pull from it right now is that we shouldn’t be so fast to equate Kelly to Weis, Kuharich, and Brennan. What’s more, with the notable exception of Ara Parseghian, the legends of Irish lore have all turned in some clunkers – Rockne went 5-4 in 1928 before going 19-0 in his final two seasons, Leahy went 4-4-1 in 1950 before going 23-4-3 in his final three seasons, Dan Devine went 7-4 before going 9-2-1 in his final season, and Holtz went 6-5-1 in 1994 before closing out his Irish tenure 17-6. There’s hope for a turnaround. On the other hand, the common thread there is that none of them lasted more than three years past their down year, and the one that even went that long had a nervous breakdown.

Well, now that we’ve cheered you up, let’s take a look at what I believe are some of the contributing factors for the untimely demise of the 2016 season.

The BVG Effect and the Booker Corollary

Let’s just get this out of the way first: The decision to retain Brian VanGorder after last season was an emotional one, and it likely cost the Irish at least four or five wins in 2016. In the offseason I said it made sense to give VanGorder one more year, but in hindsight it’s painfully obvious that in addition to what we all saw on the field there were plenty of things Kelly should’ve seen in his players and his practices that set off major alarms. There was a highly toxic mix of confusion, poor fundamentals, and morale issues that were directly caused by the way VanGorder orchestrated Notre Dame’s defensive strategy. Kelly’s decision to completely delegate defensive responsibility to his good friend and trusted adviser was very nearly the nail in his Notre Dame coffin.

Special teams were obviously disastrous all season as well, leading thousands of Notre Dame fans to wonder just what exactly Scott Booker is doing to justify drawing a paycheck. Harsh, perhaps, but this is a results-oriented business, and by the results it’s a fair question.

This had to be said, but I don’t want to devote too much time to it. Everyone agrees on it now, and in any case I believe it’s more symptom than disease – we should be interested not so much in what the BVG Effect and Booker Corollary were, but why they came to pass.

Ever onward…

Player Leadership

Nick Martin. Ronnie Stanley. Steve Elmer. Will Fuller. Chris Brown. Sheldon Day. Jaylon Smith. Joe Schmidt. Keivarae Russell. Mathias Farley. And, yes, Max Redfield.

Again, in hindsight, I’m not sure how I underestimated the loss of these guys so badly. They contributed at different levels and in different ways, but that is an absolutely enormous leadership void to fill in one year, and for the most part with guys who had never been in a leadership role at Notre Dame. This team lacked a steadying veteran hand on either side of the ball, and it showed in the way games unraveled late repeatedly. There are multiple reasons why a team might go 1-7 in one-score games (the main reason we have that +37 point differential despite our record), but a lack of player leadership is certainly a major contributing factor. This has a little bit of the disease to it, but also still a bit of the symptom.

External Factors

Refereeing decisions had an outsized impact on a few games – Texas, Navy, and Virginia Tech come to mind. The flukiest of special teams flukes, the fumble-via-wayward-bounce-off-an-unsuspecting-blocker’s-leg, opened the floodgates in one loss and added undue difficulty to a win. The ACC’s decision to play the Notre Dame – NC State game in the midst of a literal hurricane was shockingly bad, even to someone who is extremely cynical regarding conferences’ decision making processes.

My take on all that stuff is that it happens, and it doesn’t derail good teams. None of the three losses cited should’ve been close enough for officiating to matter. Same for the bad bounce against Michigan State. The NC State game is a little more whine-worthy, but even so, NC State found a way to win it. At worst it should’ve been a blip on the graph of the 2016 season.

A Coach Adrift

So where does all that lead us? I think the single biggest driver behind the 2016 collapse is something that in itself has multiple and complex drivers: Since 2012, Brian Kelly has steadily drifted away from what made him a successful head coach in the two decades prior. At Grand Valley State, at Central Michigan, at Cincinnati, and in his first few years at Notre Dame, Kelly had a clearly defined persona. He took calculated risks on the field, he made bold staff moves, he, ahem, wore his heart on his sleeve on the sideline, and he had a clearly defined approach to roster management. Most importantly, perhaps, was the giant chip he carried on his shoulder, the one that manifests itself when the guy we jokingly call BFUK comes out. Remember that smirk he gave the sideline reporter after the 2012 upset of Oklahoma? Remember “get used to it”? Those were vintage BFUK. It may not always be pleasant, but it’s an important part of being a successful coach – they need to have that extreme self-confidence that disdains people for ever having doubted them. Introspection is good, but so is edge, and I think Brian Kelly lost his edge a bit over the last few years.

Look at the VanGorder situation. Hiring VanGorder wasn’t an indefensible move; less than a year after getting pantsed by an Alabama team that said they knew what was coming, Kelly was veering away from Bob Diaco’s vanilla, bend-but-don’t-break scheme in favor of a strategy that promised more aggression and more complexity. Unfortunately, as is now quite clear, Kelly overcorrected pretty substantially. The warning signs were there in 2014, when we gave up 43 points per game over our final five regular season tilts, and were even clearer in 2015, when with a generational talent anchoring our defense we couldn’t stop giving up points and yards in bunches. To make matters worse, players were openly confused by the scheme and quietly stewing about not being able to unseat less talented theoretical Swiss Army knives (as Kelly hinted earlier this year).

Contrast the VanGorder situation with John Jancek and Joe Tresey. Jancek joined Grand Valley State in 1999 as defensive coordinator and linebackers coach, and followed Kelly to Central Michigan. Despite that connection, Kelly jettisoned Jancek after two uninspiring CMU seasons in favor of Bob Diaco and Joe Tresey, neither of whom he had any prior connection to, and was promptly rewarded by bringing home the Chippewas’ first conference title in 12 years. When Kelly went to Cincinnati, Diaco went to Virginia to work with Al Groh; Tresey stayed with Kelly and did reasonably well for two seasons. When Tresey interviewed for the Miami defensive coordinator position, though, Kelly fired him and brought Diaco back in. Even with the “next big thing” tag on the line for 2009 and with a DC who had done well with him at two programs, he didn’t hesitate – he cut the cord when he saw something he didn’t like. Trigger-happy? Maybe. But both of those dismissals stand in stark contrast to VanGorder, who pretty clearly had more leeway and more mulligans than Jancek and Tresey, and from a business perspective deserved neither.

The quarterback situation mirrors this somewhat too. Malik Zaire is by all accounts an extremely likable guy, and it seems like Kelly let his heart get the best of him. Gone was the BFUK who told the son of Notre Dame’s most accomplished football alum that he could either move to defense or stay at quarterback and never play, or who gave the gregarious Demetrius Jones the same ultimatum at Cincinnati. Kelly likes Zaire, and he let that overrule his better judgment. It wouldn’t have solved everything, but making the difficult business decision to give the QB1 role unequivocally to Deshone Kizer would’ve gone a long way to reducing the pressure on Kizer this year and providing clarity to the offense. And it may have won the Texas game.

Finally, as late Notre Dame marketing professor Brian Aikins was fond of saying, the devil is in the details. Kelly always had a reputation as a CEO coach, which is neither here nor there – in some cases it works, in some cases it doesn’t, and a coach has to do what feels most natural for him. However, something about the Notre Dame job – the non-football demands, the media demands, the fatigue of dealing with crisis after crisis that wouldn’t be an issue at another school – made him delegate to a dangerous degree, and he lost the pulse of the program. This is perhaps the biggest problem as it’s an undercurrent to all the other issues that manifested in 2016, including the catastrophic performance of the seemingly afterthought special teams units. I believe Kelly became too detached, too remote from the everyday realities of his staff and his players, and he completely missed the iceberg looming ahead. Much of the Irish malaise is clear in hindsight, and I want to be careful about retroactively declaring things obvious, but there are definitely some things Kelly should’ve noticed. With a shaky defense last year, he should’ve been more involved from Day 1 this year. With all those leaders moving on from the program, he should’ve been more attentive to player leadership issues.

Final Findings

Well… Let’s wrap up the 2016 Irish football post-mortem. There’s plenty of cause to be convinced that the death march continues apace. No Irish coach has ever recovered from a season like this, and in fact few coaches anywhere ever do. But there’s also cause to be optimistic; Kelly found tremendous success through his previous 25 years of coaching, and he didn’t find it by accident. Likewise, he didn’t just wake up in August and turn into a bad coach. It’s absolutely a tall order, and I wouldn’t even go so far as to call it probable, but I firmly believe Kelly is capable of turning it around. He needs to be very honest with himself and dig deep to restore the edge that carried him from Assumption College to the BCS national championship game; any offseason staff changes should be a good sign of how far the introspection extends. Once he restores the edge, he then has to put an enormous amount of effort in to reverse all the negative culture and morale effects of 2016, which is no simple task in itself. We need to complete two Hail Marys to have an exceptional 2017, and while the odds might be against us, at least we have a quarterback with a strong arm.

Go Irish.